The existing studies on multinational …rms'location decision have placed primary emphasis on the role of country attributes. This paper contributes to the literature by interacting country asymmetry with …rm heterogeneity and examining how multinational …rms with varied levels of total factor productivity (TFP) self-select into di¤erent host countries. Using a dataset that records the subsidiaries of over 1150 French manufacturing multinationals in 80 potential hosts, we …nd that …rm-level TFP plays an important role in explaining the sorting of French …rms across host countries. In particular, both the parametric and non-parametric estimates suggest that more productive French …rms are consistently more likely than their less e¢ cient domestic competitors to invest in host countries with high labor costs or high …xed costs. The evidence also suggests that lower host-country tari¤s discourage unproductive …rms from investing in the markets and lead to a greater proportion of investment by more productive multinational …rms.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is at the forefront of policy debates and economic research on globalization. In the past few decades, not only has the volume of investments by multinational corporations (MNCs) grown exponentially, the rate at which it increases has also outpaced that of traditional international trade ‡ows. As a result, governments in many developed countries are increasingly pressed by the public's anxiety over the possibility of job losses as more capital moves across borders. Developing country policy makers are keen to determine whether the in ‡ow of foreign direct investment improves or undercuts domestic economic performance. A large economics literature has also developed, in parallel with the tremendous political attention, to address di¤erent aspects of FDI, including both the causes and consequences of MNC activities.
However, in the voluminous literature that seeks to explain multinationals'activities abroad, primary emphasis has been placed on the asymmetry of host countries. The role of …rm heterogeneity and the consequent possibility of distinct location choices by multinational …rms even from the same industry and same home country have been largely ignored. Our paper addresses the latter issue by examining how …rms with varied levels of total factor productivity (TFP) self-select into heterogeneous host countries. Instead of assuming that host-country attributes exert a homogeneous e¤ect across individual …rms as in the current literature, we explore how the e¤ect of market size, production costs, and trade costs on …rms'location decision varies with …rm-level TFP. In our analysis, host country attributes not only determine the size of total foreign investments but also the overall productivity of multinationals that decide to produce in the markets.
We …rst build on the seminal work of Helpman et al. (2004) and model …rms'decision to invest and produce in a range of foreign countries. We contribute to the existing literature by interacting two aspects of heterogeneity: (i) …rm-level productivity and (ii) the distinct characteristics of potential host countries. Based on this framework, we predict that …rms with di¤erent TFP levels will di¤er in their selection of foreign production locations and, consequently, the pool of multinationals attracted to each host country will vary in productivity.
We use a rich dataset of French manufacturing multinational …rms and their subsidiaries worldwide to examine the location selection mechanism predicted in the model. The French experience is particularly interesting for two reasons. French …rms turn to foreign nations as sites of production facilities, the public's concern with the displacement of manufacturing jobs has grown substantially and played a prominent role in the 2007 presidential elections.
In our empirical investigation, we proceed by estimating, both parametrically and nonparametrically, how individual French …rms' prior productivity at home a¤ects their later decision to invest in foreign countries. The evidence is broadly consistent with the expectations: heterogeneous …rms vary signi…cantly in their location decisions. In particular, we …nd that while French multinational …rms on average tend to invest in countries with low unit labor costs more productive …rms are consistently more likely than their less e¢ cient counterparts to produce in high-labor-cost countries. Similarly, more productive …rms are signi…cantly more likely to invest in countries that exhibit high entry costs or high …xed costs of investment than their less productive French competitors. The host country's tari¤s on French …rms also have an asymmetric e¤ect on multinationals' location decision. A lower tari¤ rate discourages less productive …rms from investing in the markets, and leads to a larger proportion of e¢ cient multinational …rms.
In the analysis, we also address the potential endogeneity of …rm productivity resulting from either unobserved …rm attributes or reverse causality between productivity and the investment decision. The existing studies that link productivity with …rms' MNC status have mainly focused on the productivity di¤erential between multinational and non-multinational …rms. The possibility that TFP can be both a cause and an e¤ect of the investment decision has not been taken into account. This paper takes several steps to establish the causal e¤ect of TFP on MNCs'location choice. First, we estimate multinational …rms'productivity based on their past production performance at home. The use of a time and a spatial lag between the measure of TFP and the location decision reduces the likelihood that productivity is a¤ected by the latter variable.
We also employ a two-step control function approach that is developed by Train (2005, 2006) for di¤erentiated product models. Speci…cally, we pair each French multinational …rm with respective reference groups-formed by other French national or multinational …rms in the same industry, same region or both-and use the average productivity of these reference groups as instrumental variables for individual MNCs'productivity. The choice of these instruments is motivated by the large literature on technology spillover and social interaction that has suggested the existence of both industry and regional spillovers across …rms. As expected, our results show a positive and signi…cant correlation between a …rm's productivity and that of its reference groups, especially for …rms that are not only in the same industry but also in the same narrowly de…ned geographic region. We then, based on the …rst-stage estimates, recover unobserved …rm heterogeneities that may also lead to MNCs' di¤erences in location decisions. We …nd that controlling for these unobserved factors does not change the main …ndings of this paper: …rms with varied productivity are systematically sorted into di¤erent types of host countries.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. We …rst discuss the relevant literature in Section 2, including studies of FDI determinants and recent work on …rm heterogeneity. We then lay out a model in Section 3 to motivate our empirical analysis and generate testable hypotheses. After providing a detailed description of the data in Section 4, we investigate, in Section 5, the distribution of multinationals'productivity across di¤erent types of host countries. The main empirical results are then reported in Section 6, while Section 7 presents several sensitivity analyses. Last, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
An overview of the literature
This paper is closely connected to two strands of literature: the studies on the determinants of FDI and the notable development in the area of …rm heterogeneity.
Two main motives have been identi…ed in the theoretical FDI literature that help explain …rm's decision to invest abroad. First, …rms may choose to produce overseas to avoid trade costs.
This strategy is referred to as the market access (or tari¤ jumping) motive, which leads …rms to duplicate their production process in foreign countries and expand horizontally. Markusen and Venables (2000), for example, o¤er a model of such "horizontal FDI". Second, when the production process consists of various separable stages that require di¤erent factor intensities, …rms may choose to locate each stage in a country where the factor used intensively in that stage is abundant and engage in a vertical type of FDI. This strategy is referred to as the comparative advantage motive, and Helpman (1984) o¤ers a classic example of such "vertical FDI". These two motives have also been synthesized in the knowledge-capital model developed by Markusen and Venables (1998), and tested in a series of empirical studies, including, for example, Brainard Past empirical work has also examined the e¤ect of various other factors, most of which are host-country attributes including quality of institutions (e.g., Wei, 2000) , taxes (e.g., Hartman, 1984 Hartman, , 1985 , anti-dumping duties (e.g., Blonigen, 2002) , and market potential (e.g., Head and Mayer, 2004 ). 1 Similar to these studies, this paper examines the determinants of foreign direct investment.
However, instead of estimating the average e¤ect of host-country attributes across MNCs, we explore how they can a¤ect MNCs'location decision di¤erently. Our results indicate the e¤ect of FDI determinants is hardly uniform. Multinational …rms with a low productivity are less likely than more productive …rms to invest in host countries with a small market size, high production costs, or low trade costs. As a result, while countries with these attributes in general receive a smaller amount of FDI, the average productivity of French multinationals that do choose to invest in these markets is higher. This paper is also closely related to the rapidly growing literature on the relationship between …rm heterogeneity and participation in international markets. This literature is marked by a series of important …rm-level empirical studies led by Bernard and Jensen (1995 , 1999 the exposure to international trade only more productive …rms enter the export market while less productive …rms produce only for the domestic market. This theoretical prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence reported in, for example, Jensen (1999, 2004) and Clerides et al. (1998) . These studies …nd systematically higher productivity levels for exporting …rms compared to non-exporting …rms in the same industry.
The pioneering work of Melitz (2003) between multinational and non-multinational …rms. One notable exception of this literature is Head and Ries (2003) , who build a model that allows heterogeneity between countries in terms of factor price and market size and show that when the foreign country is small and o¤ers cost advantage, for a certain range of parameters, the least productive …rms locate abroad whereas more productive ones produce at home. Our paper extends the above studies by examining the relationship between …rm productivity and the choice of speci…c FDI location. In particular, we interact …rm heterogeneity with country asymmetry, and explore how MNC productivity heterogeneity explains the pattern of host country location decisions. Our results indicate that while multinational …rms are in general more productive than exporters, because of self-selection the productivity of multinational …rms that invest in di¤erent markets can be sharply di¤erent.
An issue that is particularly noteworthy in this literature and our paper is the ambiguous causality between …rm productivity and participation decision in international markets. For example, the productivity di¤erence between exporters and non-exporters can be either ex ante, because more productive …rms are more likely to export, or ex post, because exporting raises …rm productivity (through, for example, exposure to foreign technology and learning). While a large number of studies including Jensen (1999, 2004) and Clerides et al. (1998) …nd that productive …rms are self-selected into export markets, evidence of post-entry productivity changes are also reported in, for example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) and Girma et al. (2005b) .
A similar issue arises in the case of multinational …rms. While productive …rms are likely to self-select into foreign direct investment, it is also plausible that …rms'investment activities exert a positive e¤ect on their productivity. Most of the existing studies have concluded a productivity di¤erential between MNCs and exporters without addressing the direction of causality. This paper uses several measures to establish the self-selection linkage between …rm productivity and location choice. We not only include a time and a spatial lag between the measure of TFP and …rms'location decision, but also adopt a control function approach to formally address the potential endogeneity of TFP.
Theoretical framework
To illustrate multinational …rms' decision to invest in a country, we build on Helpman et al. There is a continuum of …rms in each country, each of which produces a di¤erent brand of the di¤erentiated product and exhibits a distinct productivity level whose distribution is given by G( ). Given a CES utility function, the demand function for the brand of an individual …rm,
, where x ij is the quantity, A j is a measure of the demand level for the di¤erentiated product in country j, p ij is the price, " 1=(1 ) is the demand elasticity, and j = 0; 1; :::; N . Because we assume that a constant elasticity of substitution with 0 < < 1, we have that " > 1. We also note that
ij di, where E j measures the total spending on the di¤erentiated product in country j and I j represents the set of all available brands in j. Furthermore, we assume free entry in all markets, which means that the set of available brands, i.e., the set of active …rms, in each country I j is endogenously determined. Now let us discuss …rms' behavior. Without loss of generality, we focus on domestic …rms in country 0. If …rm i in country 0 chooses to produce its product at home and sell to home consumers, it must pay a variable cost of production c 0 = i , and a …xed cost of production f D 0 . Its pro…t-maximizing strategy is thus to set p 0 = c 0 = ( i ). The pro…t a …rm receives in its domestic market is
where i
Firm i may also sell to a foreign country j = 1; :::; N . It may either export from home or produce in the foreign country. 2 If …rm i chooses to export the product to country j, it must incur a per-unit iceberg trade cost ij (> 1), which re ‡ects both the transport cost and the tari¤ 2 Note in the model we assume …rms would only consider exporting to a foreign country from home, and thus leave out the possibility of exporting from its subsidiaries abroad. In a similar fashion, we assume …rms would always supply their home country through local production and do not formally consider the case in which …rms export their products from subsidiaries abroad back to home. While these considerations are interesting especially for research focused on export-platform FDI, they will substantially complicate the model without altering the main analytical insights of the paper. For work in this area, see, for example, Motta and Norman (1996) and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) . In the empirical analysis, we do attempt to take into account these possibilities by, for example, including a measure of market potential for each host country to capture the demand in their potential export markets. country j imposes on the goods imported from i. It must also pay an additional …xed cost f X j , which includes the costs of forming a distribution and servicing network in country j. Its pro…t-maximizing strategy is hence to set p ij = ij c 0 =( i ), j = 1 ; :::; N , which yields the export pro…t as
where
On the other hand, if …rm i chooses to serve the foreign market through local production, it pays a …xed cost f I j for each foreign market j in which it chooses to invest. This includes the costs of operating a subsidiary as well as the distribution and servicing network costs embodied in f X j , which means that f I j > f X j and there exist plant-level economies of scale. In this case, the pro…t …rm i receives from investing and producing in foreign country j is
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume that
for all j. The implications of these inequality conditions are discussed below.
Firm i would serve a foreign country via FDI if I ij > X ij . This condition implies that the productivity of the …rm engaging in FDI in country j must satisfy
As in the literature, we observe two motives of FDI. First, …rms are more likely to invest in a foreign country when the variable cost of production in the foreign country, c j , is low relative to the home country, c 0 . Second, …rms may choose FDI to avoid trade costs, especially when the cost of exporting to the foreign market, ij , is high and the demand of foreign consumers, B j , is large.
Conversely, …rm i would prefer exporting to FDI if X ij > I ij and X ij > 0, which implies
Because of the inequality conditions speci…ed in (4), a clear correlation between …rm productivity and their participation in domestic and foreign markets is established. The least productive group of …rms, i.e., those with i
would not produce at all and stay outside of both markets. Firms for which D 0 < i < X j f X j = (c 0 ij ) 1 " B j 8j will produce and supply only the domestic market, while the relatively more productive …rms (with i > X j ) sell to both the domestic and the foreign country. However, in the latter group, the strategy of supplying foreign consumers further varies by the level of productivity. Those with an intermediate level
, will export to foreign country j, whereas the most productive …rms with i > I j would prefer to produce locally in country j. Now let us examine how the interaction of country characteristics and …rm heterogeneity a¤ects …rms'decision to invest in a foreign country. First, we consider the demand in the foreign country, E j . A larger demand in a foreign country implies greater pro…ts for both exporters and multinationals, even though it also means greater market competition. Such an increase in pro…ts is larger for multinational …rms because they do not need to pay a trade cost to serve the foreign consumers. As a result, …rms are more inclined to invest in, rather than export to, this foreign country. Even the relatively low-productivity …rms, which do not …nd it pro…table to invest in countries with a smaller demand, may have incentives to invest and produce in this country. This result is summarized in the proposition below, in which we relate foreign demand with the minimum (or cuto¤) productivity of multinationals. As depicted in Figure 1 , countries with a larger demand have a lower cuto¤ productivity for MNCs than the countries with a smaller demand, and therefore attract more relatively low-productivity …rms.
Proposition 1 I
j is a decreasing function of E j .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Next, we consider the costs of producing in a foreign country. Intuitively, a higher variable cost of production adversely a¤ects the pro…t of multinationals (as well as that of domestic producers).
However, exporters that are not directly a¤ected by the variable cost of production in the foreign country would bene…t from less competition and receive a greater pro…t. Consequently, …rms, especially those with relatively low productivity, may decide not to invest in the foreign country.
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the e¤ect of …xed cost of investment. An increase in either of these costs results in a rise in the cuto¤ productivity, as shown in Figure 2 , and a greater proportion of more productive multinational …rms. Formally, we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 2 I j is an increasing function of c j and f I j .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The cost of exporting to a foreign country also a¤ects …rms'investment decision to di¤erent extents. A lower exporting cost implies a higher pro…t for exporters and subsequently a larger number of exporters. Multinationals, on the other hand, are hurt by greater competition and hence receive a smaller pro…t. As shown in Figure 3 , only more productive …rms would choose to invest in the foreign country with a lower exporting cost whereas the less productive …rms would prefer exporting instead. This …nding is again re ‡ected in our proposition below:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Last, we note that as a direct implication of the above propositions …rms with a higher productivity are not only more likely to invest abroad but also more likely to invest in a wider range of host countries. For example, compared to the less productive multinational …rms which only invest in countries with a low variable cost of production, more productive …rms are likely to invest in both low-cost and high-cost host countries.
Data and empirical methodology
To test the hypotheses generated in the analytical structure, we employ two datasets of French manufacturing …rms that record …rms' …nancial data and subsidiaries abroad. Both of these datasets are drawn from AMADEUS, a comprehensive database containing …nancial and ownership information of both public and private …rms in 38 European countries. The information is collected by providers including national o¢ cial public bodies that are in charge of collecting the annual accounts (e.g., Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle (National Institute for Industrial Property) in the case of France).
The …nancial dataset includes all French manufacturing …rms that report the information required to estimate total factor productivity, namely, revenue, value added, …xed asset, labor cost, and material cost. 3 In particular, we use …rms'unconsolidated …nancial data in the period of 1993 and 2001 to derive estimates of production function and productivity. Two factors are particularly noteworthy for our goal of establishing the causal e¤ect of TFP on multinational …rms' location choices. First, by using …rms' unconsolidated …nancial data, we measure TFP solely based on …rms'production activities at home. Second, after obtaining estimates of productivity, we use …rms'TFP in 2001 to explain their decision to invest abroad in a later period. 4 The subsidiary dataset reports the location of each …rm's foreign subsidiaries in 2005. 5 As discussed above, the …ve-year gap between TFP and choice of subsidiary locations mitigates the possibility of reverse causality between the two variables. Furthermore, given the main focus of this paper is to examine …rms' decision of where to invest abroad, we limited our sample to the …rms that have at least one subsidiary overseas in 2005. In other words, …rms that have no foreign subsidiaries in 2005 were dropped from the sample. 6 The union of these two datasets resulted in a …nal sample of approximately 1150 individual French multinationals. 7 Next, we discuss in detail the dependent and explanatory variables of our analysis.
The de…nition of our dependent variable is straightforward; we use a binary variable, location ij , to represent …rm i's location decision in country j in 2005. Put di¤erently, location ij is equal to 1 if a …rm has at least one majority-owned subsidiary in a given country and 0 otherwise.
To explain multinational …rms'location decision abroad, we consider the interaction of …rm and country heterogeneity. Two …rm attributes, namely, TFP, our primary variable of interest, and labor intensity are included. The estimation strategy used to derive TFP and the distribution of French multinationals'TFP are discussed, respectively, in Appendix B and Section 5. size but also the size of potential export markets served by the host country play a signi…cant role in multinational …rms'location decisions. Following these papers, we construct a measure of market potential. Speci…cally, we calculate, for each country j, the sum of its GDP and GDP of all other countries, each of which is weighted by their distance to j, i.e., P k (1=d kj ) GDP k where d jj = 1. Real GDP in 2001 (measured in 2000 U.S. dollars) is used here. Countries with a larger total demand from domestic and export markets are considered to have a larger market potential and thus more attractive production locations. 9 5 The AMADEUS also reports the revenue and asset of foreign subsidiaries. However, these data have a large number of missing values. 6 These …rms would be needed for the comparison of productivity between multinational and other types of …rms, as seen in Section 5. However, since our paper does not focus on this issue but rather on heterogeneous multinational …rms' location choice abroad, we only consider existing and new multinational …rms. The potential bias in TFP resulted from sample selection will be addressed in Section 7 where we deal with the potential endogeneity of TFP. 7 The country coverage is determined by the availability of country data, which will be discussed next. 8 We considered a number of approaches to obtain estimates of TFP, including instrumental variables estimation and semiparametric estimation. Van Biesebroeck (forthcoming) provides a comprehensive comparison of these methods, and …nds that they produce similar productivity estimates. Similar to Van Biesebroeck (forthcoming), we did not …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the estimates of TFP obtained from either the IV or the semiparametric estimation. We report the results based on the semiparametric estimator introduced in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . 9 We also considered using sectoral ouputs as a measure of demand at the industry level. However, the data of Second, we control for host countries'Heckscher-Ohlin type comparative advantage by including their relative factor endowment, measured by the ratio of capital stock to the size of total labor force (i.e., K j =L j ). The capital stock is constructed by the perpetual inventory method outlined in Leamer (1984) , assuming a depreciation rate of 7%. The initial value of capital stocks is taken from far enough in the past so that the impact of the initial value on the estimated time series is small. Host countries'sectoral unit labor cost is also used as an alternative measure of comparative advantage and variable cost of production. The results are reported based on both measures. Data for GDP, investment and labor force are taken from the World Development Indicators, while sectoral unit labor costs are constructed based on data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). We also take into account host countries' tax policy by including the maximum corporate tax rate. 10 This data is available from the U.S.
O¢ ce of Tax Policy Research.
In addition, we include various measures of the …xed cost of investing in a host country.
First, we use the costs of starting a business as a proxy for entry cost. We also include the distance and the existence of a border between France and a host country, considering subsidiaries located in distant markets are likely to require a larger monitoring cost. Furthermore, we distinguish EU members from countries in the rest of the world, and test if the former has any particular investment-cost advantage to French multinational …rms. 11 We also include host countries'governance quality as a measure of costs of doing business. According to the existing literature, countries with a poorer governance require a greater …xed cost of investment and are thus less likely to attract multinational …rms. The data of costs of starting a business is obtained from the World Development Indicators, and the distance between Paris and the capital of a potential host is taken from the City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft. The index of governance quality is the average of three speci…c indices: control of corruption, regulator quality, and government e¤ectiveness. This data is obtained from the Polity IV database.
Trade costs are another important determinant of MNC location decisions. Transport cost between a potential host and France, measured by the distance and border between the two, raises the costs of exporting to the host country and consequently …rms'incentive to have subsidiaries. 12 In addition to transport cost, we include both the host-country and home-country tari¤ rates.
First, we include the tari¤ rate imposed by a potential host country on a French …rm's primary industry as reported in AMADEUS. We expect the higher this tari¤, the more incentive the sectoral ouputs have many missing values and would reduce our sample size substantially. 1 0 Ideally, we would like to use the applied corporate tax rate in each host country. But this data consists of a large number of missing values for the countries in our sample. 1 1 All countries that joined the EU before 2005 are treated as EU members. The role of tari¤s, a signi…cant distinction between host countries in the EU and most other countries, are taken into account separately, as discussed below. 1 2 However, recall that distance and border also a¤ect the …xed cost of investment, which adversely a¤ects MNCs' investment decision. Furthermore, we note that some …rms may export intermediate inputs from their headquarters to the potential host countries. In this case, the higher the transport cost, the less motivated are these …rms to produce abroad. As a result, the net e¤ect of distance and border is ambiguous.
French multinational …rm will have to produce inside the host country. 13 We also include the tari¤ rate France sets on the exports from the host countries. In contrast to host-country tari¤ rates, this tari¤ would adversely a¤ect multinationals that seek to export their products back to home from their subsidiaries abroad. Both tari¤ data are applied tari¤ rates measured at the SIC 3-digit level and obtained from the WITS database. Note that both the preferential tari¤s within the EU and those between the EU and other countries are re ‡ected in these data. Table   1 describes the source and summary statistics of the above variables.
[ Table 1 about here] Formally, the baseline estimation equation of this paper is
where Pr (location ij = 1) represents the probability of …rm i locating a subsidiary in country j, (:) a logistic cumulative distribution function, i denotes …rm i's productivity in a lagged period, X ij a vector of lagged host-country characteristics, and " ij the residual. In particular,
we interact i with X ij in the above equation to examine the central question of this paper: how do …rms with varied levels of productivity di¤er in their location choices?
As discussed in Section 2, a key econometric concern that is likely to arise in this framework is the potential endogeneity of i . The endogeneity may exist for two reasons. First, there can be unobserved …rm-level characteristics that a¤ect …rms'location decision abroad. Second, even though we use a lagged measure of TFP (obtained from …rms'activities at home) to explain …rms'decision to invest abroad in a later period, we still cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality because some subsidiaries may have been established before or when the TFP was observed.
To deal with the issue of omitted …rm attributes, we employ a …rm-level …xed e¤ect to control for both observed and unobserved …rm characteristics. Speci…cally, we estimate the following …xed-e¤ect Logit model
where i is vector of …rm dummies, using the conditional ML procedure proposed by Chamberlain (1980) . However, this speci…cation may still not fully account for the potential bias that exist in the interaction terms, i.e., i X ij , which leads us to adopt a control function approach in Section 7 to further address the issue of potential endogeneity in TFP.
Distribution of multinational …rms'productivity
Before we explicitly examine individual multinational …rms'location decision, we …rst take a close look at their productivity distributions. We expect from Section 3 that host countries with a smaller market size, a larger variable cost of production, and a larger …xed cost require a higher cuto¤ productivity. In other words, …rms that invest in these countries should be overall more productive than the other multinational …rms.
We perform two statistical procedures to test this prediction. First, we invoke the concept of …rst-order stochastic dominance and compare nonparametrically the productivity distribution of multinational …rms between di¤erent types of markets. 14 Alternatively, we examine speci…cally the cuto¤ productivity for each country and industry, i.e., I jk , and test if its variation is indeed consistent with the hypotheses.
To …x the idea of the …rst method, suppose there are two independent samples of heterogeneous …rms. In one sample, the productivity of …rms, , is drawn from a distribution function 1 , while follows another distribution function 2 in the other sample. Now suppose, for example, the …rst sample consists of multinational …rms that produce in high-cost host countries and the second consists of those that only produce in relatively low-cost locations. Our prediction is that the cumulative distribution of …rm productivity, , in the …rst sample …rst-order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution of in the other sample. Mathematically, we expect that
To test this prediction, we …rst adopt the two-sided KolmogorovSmirnov test to examine the equality of the two distributions, i.e., 1 ( ) = 2 ( ). If the hypothesis 1 ( ) = 2 ( ) is rejected, we then use the one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the …rst-order stochastic dominance of 1 ( ) over 2 ( ), i.e., 1 ( ) 6 2 ( ). If we fail to reject this hypothesis and given 1 ( ) 6 = 2 ( ) (obtained from the …rst step), we conclude that 1 ( ) < 2 ( ), i.e., 2 ( ) is …rst-order stochastically dominated by 1 ( ).
It is also noteworthy that, in the following tests of stochastic dominance, we use …rms'relative TFP to overcome the signi…cant productivity variation across industries. More speci…cally, we regress the TFP estimates (obtained from the production function estimations described in Appendix B) on a group of industry dummies and use the …tted residuals as the measure of within-industry heterogeneity. Now let us begin by …rst repeating the steps of the literature, such as Helpman et. al (2004) , and testing the productivity di¤erentials among multinational, exporting, and domestic …rms. The entire population of French manufacturing …rms is used for this purpose. As shown in Figure 4 and Table 2 , our results are consistent with the previous studies: not only are multinationals considerably more productive than exporters, there is also a signi…cant di¤erence between exporters and domestic …rms. We also note that multinationals that invest in multiple host countries are more productive than the average multinational …rm, as expected from Section 3. 15 [ Table 2 about here]
After con…rming the key …nding of the literature, we next move on to explore sorting among multinational …rms, the central interest of this paper. As established in Section 3, …rms with di¤erent levels of productivity should self-select into di¤erent markets. First, consider market size. Proposition 1 of Section 3 suggests that …rms that invest in small countries are more productive than those that invest only in large countries. To test this hypothesis, we generate two sub-samples to respectively represent each type of multinationals. The …rst sub-sample consists of …rms that only invest in countries with above-average market potential while the other consists of those that have subsidiaries in countries with below-average market potential (and likely some above-average market-potential countries as well). As shown in the …fth row of Table 2 , the productivity di¤erential between the two groups is signi…cant, albeit relatively small.
[Figures 4-8 about here]
We then similarly divide our sample according to host countries' capital-labor ratio, entry cost, governance quality, and tari¤. As shown in Figure 5 and Table 2 , the productivity of …rms that invest only in labor-abundant countries is stochastically dominated by those that invest in capital-abundant countries (or both). 16 Moreover, our prediction that the requirement of a higher …xed cost would lead to a selection of more productive …rms (Proposition 2) is also consistent with the data, where the …xed cost of investment is measured by the cost of starting a business, the quality of governance, distance to home country, and membership in the EU (Table   2 ). Figures 6 and 7 plot …rms'productivity distributions based on the former two attributes of host countries. It is evident that …rms that only …nd it pro…table to invest in markets with a smaller …xed cost are less productive than the other multinationals. As predicted in Proposition 3, we …nd in Figure 8 that …rms that have a particularly strong tari¤-jumping motive (i.e., invest only in high-tari¤ countries) are also signi…cantly less productive.
In addition to comparing the productivity distribution of multinational …rms, we can also directly estimate the cuto¤ productivities, i.e., I jk in the model, and the extent to which they are explained by host country characteristics. To measure I jk , we identify, for each industry k, the minimum productivity of French multinational …rms that are currently investing in country j, i.e., I jk min i [ i ], where i 2 f : location j = 1g. According to Propositions 1-3, the cuto¤ productivity should be negatively correlated with the host country's market size and the cost of exporting to that country, but positively correlated with the variable and …xed costs of production. As shown in Table 3 , these predictions are broadly con…rmed. 17 [ Table 3 about here]
Econometric results
In this section, we take our hypotheses directly to the subsidiary-level data and examine individual multinational …rms'location decision as a function of country asymmetry and …rm heterogeneity.
We use Chamberlain's (1980) conditional ML procedure to estimate how …rms with di¤erent levels of productivity may select di¤erent types of foreign production locations after controlling for both observed and unobserved …rm-level attributes.
We …rst estimate multinational …rms' location decisions by including only country-level regressors, the results of which are presented in Table 4 . 18 We see that most of the host country variables exhibit the expected e¤ect on multinational …rms'decision to invest in a foreign country. For example, multinationals are more likely to produce in countries with a larger market potential. A lower capital-labor ratio (column (1)) or a lower unit labor cost (column (2)) tends to attract more multinational …rms especially those that are labor intensive, suggesting a statistically signi…cant comparative advantage motive in French MNCs'decision to invest abroad. As expected, a high cost of starting a business discourages …rms from investing in a host country.
Countries that are remote from France and have poor-quality governance are also less likely to be selected by French multinational …rms as investment destinations. Furthermore, we …nd a signi…cant tari¤-jumping motive in French outward FDI: French multinational …rms are more likely to invest in countries that impose a higher tari¤ on imports from France. The e¤ect of home-country tari¤ is insigni…cant (but of the expected sign) in both speci…cations, whereas the parameters of the EU dummy and maximum corporate tax rate appear to have unstable signs across the two speci…cations.
[ Table 4 about here]
We now turn to the central part of our analysis, which is to investigate how …rm-level productivity leads to varied e¤ects of country attributes across individual …rms. To do so, we interact all the host-country variables with the estimated …rm TFP. The results are summarized in Table 1 7 Note that I jk is only observed for countries and industries that have at least one French multinational …rm. In other words, I jk is not observed in countries with prohibitive cuto¤ productivities, which gives rise to a sample selection issue. To correct for the potential sample selection bias in the estimation of the cuto¤ productivity, we use the Heckman (1979) selection model and proceed in two stages. First, we estimate the probability of at least one French subsidiary in a host country and a particular industry. Then, we estimate the cuto¤ productivity, taking into account the selection bias re ‡ected in the inverse mills ratio obtained from the …rst stage. 1 8 We use respectively a country's K/L ratio and sectoral unit labor cost in columns (1) and (2) to represent its comparative advantage. However, because of the large number of missing values in the data of sectoral unit labor cost, the sample size is considerably smaller in column (2). 5 . We …nd that a higher capital-labor ratio on average discourages French multinational …rms from investing in a foreign country but its marginal e¤ect is smaller for …rms with a higher productivity (suggested by the parameter of the interaction of TFP with K/L ratio). According to column (1), for an average-productivity multinational …rm the odds of investing in a foreign country is 42-percent (= 0:50 + 0:26 mean(T F P )) lower when the country's capital-labor ratio is 100-percent greater. This e¤ect decreases to 16 percent for multinationals whose TFP is 100-percent higher than the average. A similar …nding applies to …rms'choice between low and high labor-cost countries. The probability of investing in countries where labor is relatively expensive is higher for …rms with higher TFP. This is consistent with our hypothesis in Proposition 2: only the more productive …rms would …nd investing in these types of countries pro…table.
[ Table 5 about here]
The e¤ect of our various measures of …xed costs is also asymmetric across …rms as predicted in Proposition 2. While …rms on average are less likely to invest in a country with high entry costs, its adverse e¤ect is lessened for more productive …rms. Speci…cally, compared to an average-productivity …rm whose odds of investing in a foreign country decreases by 14 percent (= 0:16 + 0:07 mean(T F P )) when entry cost is 100-percent greater, MNCs with twice the average TFP will only see a decrease of 7 percent. Similarly, the e¤ect of distance and border in …rms'choice of production locations diminishes with productivity. Furthermore, while …rms are on average more likely to locate production in countries with better governance quality, this e¤ect is signi…cantly smaller for more productive …rms.
The role of host-country tari¤s in prompting …rms to invest in a foreign country also varies with …rms'productivity level. As expected from Proposition 3, more productive …rms are more likely than their less e¢ cient rivals to invest in the foreign country with low tari¤s. In particular, while the odds of an average-productivity MNC investing in a foreign country is 17-percent lower when tari¤ falls by 100 percent, it is only 6-percent lower for MNCs with twice the TFP. The intuition behind this result is that a lower tari¤ raises the export pro…t and leads to an increase in competition; as a result, only …rms with a relatively high productivity will …nd it pro…table to invest in the market. French sectoral tari¤s also exert an asymmetric e¤ect on …rms'incentive to invest abroad. More productive French …rms are less likely to invest abroad when the cost of exporting products back to France is high. 19 Two results in Table ( 4) are inconsistent with our predictions. In column (1), we …nd that the e¤ect of market potential on …rms'probability of investing in a country is greater for more productive …rms. A possible explanation is that while a larger market size means a greater demand for the products it also raises the competition. As a result, only more productive …rms would be able to overcome the competition and still …nd it pro…table to produce in the market. The other result that is not predicted analytically is the positive correlation between the host-country corporate tax rate and multinationals'incentive to invest in a foreign country, especially for multinationals with a lower productivity. This …nding can be attributed to two related possibilities. First, the corporate tax rate used in this paper is not necessarily the rate that would apply to multinational …rms. Second, as pointed out by Scholes and Wolfson (1990) and Swenson (1994) , it is possible that a higher corporate tax, by increasing the tax liabilities of domestic …rms (and MNCs under a territorial tax system), can lead to an increase in inward FDI especially for MNCs under a worldwide taxation system (as in the case of French multinational …rms).
Sensitivity analysis
Given the goal of this paper is to investigate how the asymmetry in country attributes and …rm productivity explains …rms' location choices, it is important to isolate the potential e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneities and reverse causality. We, therefore, undertake several sensitivity analyses in this section to examine the robustness of our results.
New entries of multinational …rms
We previously used …rms'lagged productivity -estimated based on their home production performance -to explain the current choice of subsidiary locations. Nevertheless, some subsidiaries may have been established before or when the TFP was observed and therefore have a spillover e¤ect on …rms'performance at home. We modify our dataset in this subsection to mitigate the possibility of reverse causality between TFP and …rms'location choice. Speci…cally, we modify the dataset such that the set of countries available for each individual …rm to set up subsidiaries includes only those where this …rm has not invested before 2001 (the latest year the TFP was observed). Thus, the analysis here is focused on MNCs'decision to enter a host country market between 2001 and 2005.
[ Table 6 about here]
As shown in Table 6 20 The estimation results are largely similar to Table 5 . More productive …rms are more likely than their rivals to set up new subsidiaries in capital-abundant countries or countries with high sectoral unit labor costs. They are also more likely to enter countries where it is costly to start a business, geographically distant from France, outside the European Union, and have a poor governance, all of which are factors that may lead to a large …xed cost of investment.
Furthermore, countries that set relatively low tari¤s attract the entry of …rms with higher TFP.
Endogeneity of TFP: control function approach
The concern noted above about possible correlation between TFP and …rms' past investment locations can be generalized to a broader econometric issue, that is, the endogeneity of …rm productivity. TFP is endogenous when it is correlated with the residuals of the equation, which may include either past investment activities or unobserved …rm attributes such as human capital or political assets. While our speci…cation has controlled for all …rm characteristics via …rm …xed e¤ect, it does not rule out the endogeneity of interaction terms formed by TFP and country characteristics. For example, our results in Table 5 show that more productive …rms are less adversely a¤ected by host countries' governance quality. But this might be capturing the role of …rms' political assets that is correlated with productivity. In this sub-section, we therefore employ a control function approach to correct for the potential endogeneity of TFP. 21 This control function method is developed by Train (2005, 2006) to control for unobserved factors in di¤erentiated products models and address the endogeneity of prices. They exploit the information contained in the endogenous variable (e.g., prices) to recover unobserved variables, which are then used to form controls in the main estimation equation to condition out the dependence of the endogenous variable on the error term.
Our objective is to deal with the bias that exists in the following equation:
where i represents an unobserved …rm variable that is correlated with i and, similar to i , can lead to varied e¤ects of X ij on …rms' location decision. We proceed in two stages. First, we derive an estimate of i based on^
where Z i is the instrument vector we use to estimate …rm productivity, i.e., E( i jZ i ). ), and Keller and Yeaple (2007) . 22 It is also related to the studies on social inter-action, such as the recent work by Guiso and Schivardi (2007) , which …nds strong evidence of social interaction in …rms'structural adjustment especially for …rms in the same industry and geographic district. In light of these …ndings, we construct three reference groups for each French …rm in the sample: (i) …rms in the same SIC 4-digit industry; (ii) …rms located in the same region (département) of France; 23 (iii) …rms from the same industry and same region. Note that these reference groups are constructed using all French manufacturing …rms available from the AMADEUS database (excluding the …rm of interest), which include both multinational and national …rms. 24 If there exists an intra-industry spillover (due to, for example, technology transfer) the productivity of an individual …rm should be (positively) correlated with the productivity of its reference groups (i) and (iii), whereas in the case of regional spillover we should observe a signi…cant correlation for …rms in (ii) and (iii). When both industry and regional spillover are present, the productivity correlation should be strongest for …rms that are not only in the same industry but also geographically close (group (iii)).
Plausible instruments in this case
After obtaining an estimate of i , i.e.,^ i , we estimate the following equation in the second stage (again using Chamberlain's conditional ML procedure):
where^ i is interacted with host country attributes, X ij . If the coe¢ cient of^ i X ij , i.e., , is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, we reject the hypothesis of exogenous TFP.
[ Table 7 about here]
The results are reported in Table 7 . 25 As shown in the …rst-stage estimates, …rm productivity is signi…cantly and positively correlated with the average productivity of its peers in the same industry This correlation is also particularly strong for peers that are located in the same region, even when the industry …xed e¤ect is included in column (2) . Geographic proximity alone, however, does not always appear to play a signi…cant role in productivity spillovers. We further notice that, in the second stage, while the signi…cance of the estimated coe¢ cient of^ i X ij rejects the exogeneity of TFP, correcting for the endogeneity does not signi…cantly change our estimates.
Our previous …ndings that productive …rms are more likely to invest in countries with a greater capital abundance, a higher entry cost, a larger distance from home, a poorer governance quality, and a lower tari¤ remain largely robust. 2 3 We consider …rms from the same département as one geographic group. Départements, analogous to English counties, are administrative units of France and many former French colonies. Our sample consists of …rms from totally 92 départements. 2 4 In the construction of the instrumental variables, those …rms that are the only observation in their industry and region were dropped because of the lack of reference group (iii). We also considered excluding multinational …rms in the formation of reference groups. The results remain largely similar. 2 5 Because the estimation consists of …tted values obtained from an earlier stage, we use bootstrapping to correct the standard errors.
Unobserved country asymmetry
Last, we address the possibility of unobserved host-country characteristics, such as political relationship with France, that may also a¤ect …rms'incentive to invest. To do so, we include, in addition to the …rm …xed e¤ect, a country …xed e¤ect j (where j represents host country) to control for all country speci…c attributes. 26 The results are reported in Table 8 . As shown, controlling for unobserved country-industry asymmetry does not change our main results. 27 The interaction of country characteristics and …rm productivity remains to play a signi…cant and expected role in French multinationals'location choices.
[ Table 8 about here]
Conclusion
Foreign direct investment and …rm heterogeneity are two prominent research areas that have attracted a substantial amount of attention from both economists and policy makers. We contribute to these strands of literature by interacting …rm heterogeneity with country asymmetry and examining how …rms'di¤erences in productivity can lead to distinct choices of foreign production locations.
The theoretical analysis suggests that there should be a systematic relationship between an individual …rm's productivity and its selection of production location. In particular, more productive …rms are more likely than their less e¢ cient competitors to invest in a country with a relatively small demand. They are also more likely to produce in countries where the variable cost of production and …xed cost of investment are high. In contrast, countries that set a relatively high tari¤ on imported goods will attract both productive and unproductive …rms to invest in the markets.
We test these analytical hypotheses using a dataset of French manufacturing multinational …rms. The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with these predictions. Both the parametric and non-parametric estimates suggest that …rms'choice of host countries varies signi…cantly with their total factor productivity. More productive …rms are signi…cantly more likely to overcome the costs of operating plants and to invest in countries that require high labor costs, high entry barriers, and large …xed costs of investment. The probability of investing in countries that set relatively low tari¤s is also higher for these …rms. 2 6 Ideally, we would like to include country-industry …xed e¤ect to control for all country-speci…c sectoral variables. However, given the nature of Chamberlain's (1980) conditional ML procedure that is used to estimate …xed-e¤ect Logit models, including a country-industry …xed e¤ect would drop out all the country-industry pairs where no French multinationals are present. This would substantially reduce the size of the sample. 2 7 Note the interpretation of estimated coe¢ cients obtained from the Linear Probability model is di¤erent from those obtained from the Logit model. The former represent elasticities of the probability. tion approach. In this approach, we pair each French multinational …rm with respective reference groups, formed by other French national and multinational …rms in the same industry, same region, or both, and use the average productivity of the reference groups as instruments.
The results suggest the causal e¤ect of productivity on multinationals'location decision remains largely robust-…rms with varied productivity are systematically sorted into di¤erent types of host country markets.
These …ndings also convey an important message to host-country policy makers: Changes in investment or trade policies will not only a¤ect the volume of foreign direct investment but also the average productivity of multinational …rms that decide to enter the host country. For example, an increase in tari¤s may in fact stimulate FDI but does so by increasing the entry of less productive …rms. To the extent that there might be domestic productivity spillovers from foreign MNCs, it is crucial to be aware that the productivity composition of multinationals is not homogeneous and there can be decreasing returns to using trade policy as means of attracting multinational …rms.
While this paper focuses on exploring the role of …rm heterogeneity in multinationals'location decision, it can be extended in two main directions. First, like the majority of the literature, this paper has assumed that a …rm's decision to invest in one location is independent of their locations in third countries. This assumption is increasingly challenged by real world observations as more multinational …rms adopt complex integration strategies. For example, many …rms today are engaging in export-platform FDI, in which case the decision to invest in a foreign country does not only depend on the costs of exporting to that country from multinationals' home but also the costs of exporting from subsidiaries abroad. Blonigen et al. Second, most analyses in this area have treated multinationals' location decision as static, despite the fact that …rms often adjust their location choices by expanding in new markets and contracting in less attractive locations. While this paper has examined the entry of multinational …rms into new host countries (in Section 7.1) as an attempt to disentangle the causality between productivity and location choice, the relationship between …rm productivity and location adjustments is a question that can be further explored with the facilitation of additional time series data.
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume …rm productivity, i.e., , has a pareto distribution, i.e., G( ) = 1 (b= ) k , where b is the minimum productivity in the industry and k is the shape parameter. As a result, we …nd I( ) =
" k 1 and
In order to identify the relationship between E j and I j , we examine the following equation:
By substituting equations (a.5), (a.6), and (a.8) into equation (a.4) and solving for
, we obtain
In the above equation,
> 0, and
A.2 Proof for Proposition 2: I j is an increasing function of c j and f I j .
Proof. To examine the relationship between c j and I j , we consider
(a.11) @ I j =@B j < 0 as de…ned in equation (a.5), and
we obtain
Now by substituting equations (a.5), (a.12) and (a.14) into equation (a.10) and solving for
we obtain:
(a.15)
In the above equation, because
positive. Furthermore, we note that because
we get
Therefore, the sign of
will be positive if
Now we derive:
; (a. 16) and consequently
and thus d I j =dc j > 0. To examine the relationship between f I j and I j , we consider
@ I j =@B j < 0 as de…ned in equation (a.5), and
By substituting equations (a.5), (a.21) and (a.23) into equation (a.19) and solving for
Similar to equation (a.15), the denominator of
Proof. To examine the relationship between ij and I j , we consider
By substituting equations (a.5), (a.27) and (a.29) into equation (a.25) and solving for
Because the denominator of
we …nd
Appendix B Estimates of Productivity
In the large literature of production function estimations, a long recognized concern is a simultaneity problem generated by the potential correlation between input demand and unobserved productivity shocks. The economics underlying this concern is intuitive. Firms that experience a positive productivity shock may respond by using more inputs. This simultaneity, if true, would bias the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of production functions and, consequently, the estimates of productivity. A novel approach has been suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) . They propose to adopt …rm-level investment, which is considered as a strictly increasing function of unobserved productivity shocks, as a proxy to control for the correlation between input levels and the productivity term. A similar strategy is developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , who suggest the use of intermediate inputs (e.g., raw materials and energy) as the proxy variables. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also point out that the procedure introduced in Olley and Pakes (1996) must satisfy the monotonicity condition between investments and productivity shocks and thus would truncate all the observations with zero investment. This could create problems when …rms only make intermittent investments.
In this analysis, we considered both the IV estimator using lagged values of inputs as the instrumental variable and Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) semiparametric estimator. The results reported in the paper are based on the TFP estimates obtained from the latter approach. The details of this approach are described next. Formally, we estimate the following production function,
where the log of value added y it , i.e., gross output net of material costs, is a function of the logs of employment l it , capital k it and productivity shocks it . The demand for material is considered a function of it and k it , i.e.,
and assumed to be monotonic in it for all k it . Value added, material costs, and capital are all de ‡ated by their respective de ‡ators, taken from France National Institute for Statistics and Eco-nomics Studies (INSEE). Given the monotonicity, one can invert the material demand function to obtain it = it (m it ; k it ) and rewrite the production function as
We now proceed in two stages. In the …rst stage, consider the expectation of equation (b.3)
conditional on m it and k it ,
Subtracting the above equation from (b.3) yields
By assumption " it is mean independent of l it , no-intercept OLS can be used to obtain consistent estimates of l . To be speci…c, we estimate equation (b.6) by substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in m it and k it in place of it (m it ; k it ).
Since capital enters it (:) twice, a more complete model is used in the second stage to identify k . Assuming it follows a …rst-order Markov process and capital does not immediately respond to the innovations in productivity over last period's expectation, de…ned as it = it E[ it j i(t 1) ], we obtain^ k as the solution to
Then, based on the consistent estimates of l and k , we obtain the estimated levels of produc-
Because industries are di¤erent in their labor and capital intensities, we estimate the production function for each SIC 3-digit industry and obtain the productivity for each …rm based on the industry-speci…c production-function estimates. (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii) OLS estimates are reported. (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported. (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported. (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported. (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported.
